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I. INTRODUCTION
When Benjamin Franklin pondered 1 “When will mankind be
convinced and agree to settle their difficulties by arbitration?” he probably did
not expect that after over 300 years of successful arbitration history 2
the world is still not convinced. The storm of protest from all
quarters of society and all corners of the world in regard to the new
investment arbitration chapters in the Trans Pacific Partnership
Agreement3 and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership4
suggest the opposite - a deep mistrust in at least one field of
arbitration: international investment arbitration.5 An illustrative
example is the editorial of Wellington’s Dominion Post6:

DAVE FARNHAM, SNIPPETS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN (2014).
For an overview of arbitration history (even predating 300 years), see
GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §1.01 (Kluwer, Alphen
aan den Rijn, 2nd ed., 2014).
3 Text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, NEW ZEALAND FOREIGN AFFAIRS &
TRADE,
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/about-us/who-we-are/treaty-makingprocess/trans-pacific-partnership-tpp/text-of-the-trans-pacific-partnership
(last
visited Apr. 2, 2016).
4 Documents
and
events,
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/documents-andevents/index_en.htm#_documents (last visited Apr. 2 2016).
5 Leon E. Trakman, Investment Dispute Resolution under the Transpacific
Partnership Agreement: Prelude to a Slippery Slope? (2013); Leon E. Trakman Investor-State
Arbitration: Evaluating Australia’s Evolving Position (2011); Jess Hill, TPP clauses that let
Australia be sued are weapons of legal destruction, says lawyers, THEGUARDIAN (Nov. 9,
2015), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/nov/10/tpps-clauses-that-letaustralia-be-sued-are-weapons-of-legal-destruction-says-lawyer (last accessed 4 May
2016); George Monbiot, This transatlantic trade deal is a full-frontal assault on democracy,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
4,
2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/04/us-trade-deal-fullfrontal-assault-on-democracy; The arbitration game; Investor-state dispute settlement, THE
ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2014; Martin Khor, The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
(TPPA): When Foreign Investors Sue the State, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Sept. 1, 2013),
http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement-tppa-whenforeign-investors-sue-the-state/5357500; Daniel Kalderimis, Investor/state arbitration,
the TPP and New Zealand, CHAPMAN TRIPP (July 28, 2015),
http://leanz.org.nz/uploads/presentations/Kalderimis_LEANZ%20Presentation_
280715.pdf; Bianca Mueller, The Devil in the TPPA – Investor State Dispute Settlement,
SCOOP (Mar. 22, 2015), http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL1503/S00196/thedevil-in-the-tppa-investor-state-dispute-settlement.htm (last accessed 4 May 2016);
1
2
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But the non-trade aspects of the deal are the most
worrying. The worst is the mechanism allowing
foreign companies to sue New Zealand in
controversial offshore tribunals. This raises serious
problems of sovereignty and fairness.
These tribunals are not courts as we understand them.
They are courts dedicated to the interests of investors,
rather than countries. Appeals are very limited.
Conflicts of interest among those on the tribunals are
not rigorously controlled. Judgments are not required
to be consistent.
Responsibility for the public’s mistrust in investor-state
arbitration lies partly with human rights lawyers’ and activists’
[“human rights lobby”] claims of lack of transparency, investor bias
and the disregard of citizens’ human rights. 7 The human rights lobby
has painted the investors as the big bad wolves. The state and its
citizens are red riding hood and the arbitral tribunals, as the Brothers
Grimm, are re-writing the happy end. The international arbitration
profession, on the other hand, has shied away from a thorough
engagement with human rights and seems to have a severe case of
“Berührungsangst”.8

Julien Chaisse, The shifting tectonics of international investment law - structure and dynamics of
rules and arbitration on foreign investment in the Asia-Pacific region, 47 GEO. WASH. INT’L
L. REV. 563 (2015).
6 EDITORIAL: It’s too soon to celebrate the singing of this “free trade” deal,
DOMINION POST, ed., Jan. 15, 2016.
7 UN experts voice concern over adverse impact of free trade and investment
agreements on human rights, UNITED NATIONS HOMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER
(June
2,
2015),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=160
31; Andrew Geddis, Of TPP’s, ISDS’s and the Constitution, PUNDIT (Oct. 5, 2015),
http://pundit.co.nz/content/of-tpps-isdss-and-the-constitution; Open Letter, TPP
LEGAL, https://tpplegal.wordpress.com/open-letter/ (last accessed 4 May 2016).
8 Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?, 60
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 573, 576 (2011); see also Ciaran Cross & Christian SchliemannRadbruch, When Investment Arbitration curbs Domestic Regulatory Space: Consistent
Solutions through Amicus Curiae Submissions by Regional Organisations, 6 L. & DEV. REV.
67, 87 (2013) (et seq. which show that arbitral tribunals have not taken the
opportunity to clarify the role of human rights in investment arbitration); see also
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The widespread absence of a discussion of investors’ rights
by the human rights lobby and the general lack of willingness by the
international arbitration community to engage with human rights
issues is concerning. It is concerning because, in particular for
developing countries, sustainable economic development requires
both: foreign direct investment and the protection of human rights.9
The aim of this think piece is to provide a basis to fill the
gaps in both discussions by firstly describing the international human
rights framework and in particular discussing whether and which
human rights are available to investors and a state’s citizens. The
paper will then examine how a human rights analysis is relevant in an
investment arbitration and why there is no need for the investment
arbitration community to have “Berührungsängste”. By doing so the
paper proposes a framework that will allow for the consistent
inclusion of the International Bill of Human Rights (“IBR”) and
customary international human rights as a benchmark in investorstate dispute settlement. A consistent human rights benchmark is
important since investor state dispute settlement can take place in
competing jurisdictions, such as national courts, investment
arbitration, regional human rights courts, or the International Court
of Justice. There is therefore a need for promoting consistent human
rights benchmarking among diverse national, regional and worldwide
courts, and alternative dispute settlement proceedings.
The paper is also a contribution against the fragmentation of
international law.10 It is the thesis of this paper that the IBR and
customary international human rights provide the international
constitutional framework in which any investment treaty is situated
and in which international arbitral tribunals have to operate. To

Yannik Radi, Realizing Human Rights in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Perspective from
within the International Investment Law Toolbox, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1107,
1116 (2011). However, as an exception to the rule discussion of art 14 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, see Hersham Talaat v. Indonesia,
UNCITRAL (Dec. 14, 2015).
9 See Megan Wells Scheffer, Bilateral Investment Treaties: A Friend or Foe to
Human Rights?, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 483, 483 (2011).
10 See Ursula Kriebaum & Christoph Schreuer, The Concept of Property in
Human
Rights
Law
and
International
Investment
Law,
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/88_concept_property.pdf.
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illustrate the difference, the proposed framework will make to the
discussion of investors’ rights versus citizens’ rights, the new
framework will be applied to a case scenario. It is noteworthy to
stress that the investment treaty perspective on human rights
significance is not the main focus of this paper, 11 albeit some
reference will be made.12
II. HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the
birthrights of all human beings; their protection and
promotion is
the
first responsibility
of
13
Governments.
There are several human rights frameworks which could be
used to determine the citizens’ and the investor’s rights: particular
domestic human rights frameworks, regional frameworks in some
parts of the world, and the international human rights framework.
The international human rights framework encompasses the IBR
containing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and
the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
(“ICESCR”). 14 As Stephen Gardbaum convincingly argues, the IBR
has to be seen as part of the international constitutional order. 15 It

11 See for very detailed discussion from the investment law perspective
Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human Rights?, 60 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 573 (2011); Yannik Radi, Realizing Human Rights in Investment Treaty
Arbitration: A Perspective from within the International Investment Law Toolbox, N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1107 (2011); Vivian Kube & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,
Human rights law in international investment arbitration, EUI Working Papers (Law
2016/02).
12 See below II.D.
13 Vienna Declaration, sec. 1.
14 Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev.1), The International Bill of Human Rights, OHCHR,
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf.
15 Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as International Constitutional Rights, 19
EUR. J. INT’L L. 749 (2008); see also Erika de Wet, The International Constitutional Order,
55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 51 (2006); see also, Andreas Paulus, The International Legal
System as a Constitution in JEFFREY DUNOFF & JOEL TRACHTMAN, RULING THE
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specifies the limits on how governments treat people within their
jurisdictions. It enshrines and clarifies the distinct normative basis for
the protection of fundamental rights as rights of human beings rather
than as rights of citizens. That means international human rights do
not make a difference between nationals and foreigners. The human
rights obligations contained in the ICCPR and ICESCR have erga
omnes effect to the extent that they have acquired customary
international law status.16 That means that those rights enshrined in
the IBR are applicable whether or not states are member states to
the IBR or its parts.17 As a result, the IBR is applicable in every
country around the world as part of the international constitutional
order,18 laying down a global human rights standard19 for every
WORLD? CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW & GLOBAL GOVERNMENT
69 (CUP, Cambridge, 2009).
16 JAMES
CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 642 (8th ed., 2012); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, L’unité de
l’ordre juridique international in RECUEIL DES COURS DE L’ACADÉMIE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL, vol. 297, 382-85 (2002); Erika de Wet, The International
Constitutional Order, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 51, 61 (2006); for IESCR, see U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Poverty
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. No.
E/C.12/2001/10, para 16 (May 2001). Ernst Ulrich Petersmann states: “Human
rights have thus become part also of the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations (Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice)” in Time for
Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations Lessons from European
Integration Law for Global Integration Law, NYU INSTITUTES ON THE PARK,
http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/01/012301-05.html.
17 Based on the global recognition of those rights as the essence of what
somehow natural right to every human being belongs just by being born as one,
those rights cannot leave out any single individual, regardless of their nationality.
See Horst Dreier, in: Dreier (Hrsg.), GG, Bd. 1, 2. Aufl., 2004, Vorb. Rdn. 25,
Gerhard Herdegen in Maunz/Dürig, Grundgesetz-Kommentar, 78. EL September
2016, Art. 1 Abs. 2, marginal no. 31, 32, Herbert Bethge in Maunz/SchmidtBleibtreu/Klein/Bethge, Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz, 49. EL Juli 2016,
BVerfGG Rn. 90, marginal no. 65.
18 Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as International Constitutional Rights, 19
THE EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 749, 768 (2008) (“international human rights law also
functions to enshrine and clarify the distinct normative basis for the protection of
fundamental rights as rights of human beings rather than as rights of citizens”).
19 Compare with Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as International
Constitutional Rights, 19 THE EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 749, 768 (2008); see also Lucas
Lixinski, Treaty Interpretation by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Expansionism
at the Service of the Unity of International Law, 21 THE EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 585 (2010).
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human being notwithstanding whether they are a citizen or foreigner.
The IBR provides the baseline global human rights protection. 20
Whether, or in which circumstances, (additional) human rights
enshrined in regional and/or domestic human rights standards have
to be taken into account in investor state dispute resolution, is not
within the scope of this paper.
How investment tribunals have to have regard to the IBR will
be discussed under II.C.2. In the following the paper will outline the
rights of the state’s citizens and that of the investor under the IBR.
A. The Rights of the State Citizens
The human rights lobby is claiming in particular the following
rights as being jeopardized by investor state relationships and the
resulting disputes: the right to health21, the right to water22, the right
As Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann points out “Dictatorial governments can
no longer freely ‘contract out’ of their human rights obligations by withdrawing
from UN human rights covenants or ILO conventions” in Time for Integrating
Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations Lessons from European Integration
Law for Global Integration Law, THE JEAN MONNET CENTER FOR INT’L AND REG.
ECON. L. AND JUST., http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/01/01230105.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2016) (That must be true not only for dictatorial
governments but generally in regard to the inability of states to contract out of
“human rights”).
21 The IECSR Committee has interpreted the “right to health, as defined
in article 12.1, as an inclusive right extending not only to timely and appropriate
health care but also to the underlying determinants of health, such as access to safe
and potable water and adequate sanitation, an adequate supply of safe food,
nutrition and housing, healthy occupational and environmental conditions, and
access to health-related education and information, including on sexual and
reproductive health. A further important aspect is the participation of the
population in all health-related decision-making at the community, national and
international levels.” The right to health encompasses the control over one’s health
and body, including sexual and reproductive freedom, and the right to be free from
interference, such as the right to be free from torture, non-consensual medical
treatment and experimentation; the right to a system of health protection which
provides equality of opportunity for people to enjoy the highest attainable level of
health, including, for example, access (non-discriminatory, economic, physical,
information) to functioning public health and health-care facilities [ICESCR General
Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12)
Adopted at the Twenty-second Session of the Committee on Economic, Social and
20
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to a sustainable or healthy environment 23, the right of indigenous
peoples to their ancestral lands24, and the right to development 25 of
Cultural Rights, on Aug. 11, 2000 (Contained in Doc. E/C.12/2000/4), paras 8, 11,
1). In regard to a comprehensive treatment of the right to health, see JOHN TOBIN,
THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012) and VALENTINA VADI,
PUBLIC HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION
(2012).
22 The right to water encompasses, inter alia, sufficient, safe, acceptable,
physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses. States
need to take steps on a non-discriminatory basis to prevent threats to health from
unsafe and toxic water conditions. General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water
(Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant), Adopted at the Twenty-ninth Session of the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, on Jan. 20, 2003 (Contained
in Doc. E/C.12/2002/11, paras. 2, 8). With regard to a comprehensive treatment
of the right to health, see EIBE RIEDEL & PETER ROTHEN, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO
WATER (Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2006).
23 The right encompasses the right to a non-polluted environment, which
does not endanger health, life and development. The right also comprises the
obligation of the state and the community of states to repair any damage done by
pollution. Gheorghe Durac, Granting the Right to a Quality Environment -A Premise of
Sustainable Development, 9 PESD 153, 154 (2015); John Lee, Underlying Legal Theory to
Support a Well-Defined Human Right to a Healthy Environment as a Principle of Customary
International Law, 25 COLUM. J. OF ENVTL. L. 283. (2000). For an overview of the
protection of the environment in regional and domestic human rights instruments,
see Alan Boyle, Human Rights and the Environment: A Reassessment, UNEP,
http://www.unep.org/environmentalgovernance/Portals/8/documents/Events/
HumanRightsEnvironmentRev.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2016).
24
UN Indigenous Peoples Declaration, Art 1(1): “Indigenous peoples
have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally
owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.” The central right is the right to
the enjoyment of ancestral lands. Mihail Krephchev, The Problem of Accommodating
Indigenous Land Rights in International Investment Law, 6 J. OF INT’L INVESTMENT L.,
42; see generally JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(OUP, 1996).
25 Declaration on the Right to Development (1986), Art 1(1): “The right
to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human
person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy
economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.” The Declaration in its 10 articles
requires states to guarantee rights in a manner applicable to globalisation, ie it
compels states to cooperate with each other to the best of their abilities and
resources to achieve development throughout the world: see for a general
discussion DANIEL AGUIRRE, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN A
GLOBALISED WORLD (2008); Stephen Marks, Beate Rudolf, Koen De Feyter, &
Nicolaas Schrijver, The role of international law in U.N., OFFICE OF THE HUMAN

336

2017

Butler

5:2

the citizens in the particular country.26 Those citizens’ rights, the
human rights claims, are given no weight by investment tribunals.
Tribunals were only concerned with the rights of investors.
The right to health and the right to water are enshrined in the
IBR.27 Thus, human beings have a right to health and to water
notwithstanding the country they live in. The right to a sustainable or
healthy environment and the right to development did not find their
way explicitly into the IBR. Today, both rights are afforded at least
near close to customary international law status.28 The right of
indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands is protected by the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The Declaration is

RIGHTS COMMISSIONER, REALIZING THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS IN
COMMEMORATION OF 25 YEARS OF THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON
THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT 445, 454 (U.N. Publication, 2013).
26 In regard to general criticism, see Investor State Dispute Settlement- The
Arbitration
Game,
THE
ECONOMIST,
Oct.
11,
2014,
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21623756governments-are-souring-treaties-protect-foreign-investors-arbitration;
Claire
Provost and Matt Kennard, The obscure legal system that allows corporations to sue countries,
THE
GUARDIAN,
June
10,
2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/10/obscure-legal-system-letscorportations-sue-states-ttip-icsid; Still not loving ISDS: 10 reasons to oppose investors’
super-rights in EU trade deals, CORPORATE EUROPE OBSERVATORY, July 14, 2014,
http://corporateeurope.org/international-trade/2014/04/still-not-loving-isds-10reasons-oppose-investors-super-rights-eu-trade.
27 ISECR Art 12, Art 11 (1); in addition, the U.N. General Assembly
recognised the right to water and sanitation as a human right specifically in
U.N.G.A. Res. 64/292, 64th Session A/RES/64/292 (July 28, 2010).
28 For the right to a sustainable environment see John Lee, The Right to a
Healthy Environment, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 283, 338 (2000); see Susan Glazebrook,
Human Rights and the Environment, VUWLR: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PACIFIC 293
(2009); Prue Taylor, From Environmental to Ecological Human Rights: A New Dynamic in
International Law?, 10 GEO. INT’L. ENVTL. L. REV. 309 (1997); For the right to
development see Isabella Bunn, The Right to Development: Implications for International
Economic Law, 15 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 1425, 1436 (2000). It also should be noted
that due to human rights law establishes a responsibility on part of the state toward
those under its jurisdiction, and not solely an obligation between states, the
Restatement has drawn a subtle distinction between the manner in which
customary human rights law is established from that which creates customary
international law in general. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§ 701 (1987), reporter’s note 2.
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not binding law. The formulation of the rights therein, however,
reflects emergent customary international law.29
It is the nature of human rights law to create obligations on
the part of the state towards those under its jurisdiction. The IBR
clearly stipulates states’ obligations, for example, Article 2 (1) of the
ICESCR reads:
[T]o take steps, individually and through international
assistance and co-operation, especially economic and
technical, to the maximum of its available resources,
with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in the present
Covenant by all appropriate means, including
particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
Article 2(1) of ICESCR compels the community of states to
work towards attaining the best standard of health possible for its
citizens. It also requires every state to make every effort to provide
for sufficient clean water. Of particular interest are the states’
obligations in regard to the right to development. The right to
development encapsulates a resonance of the core principles of all
human rights including, primarily, equity, non-discrimination, active
and meaningful participation, accountability and transparency.30 For
the right to be effective, another core part of the right to
development is that states have a duty by themselves, and in
29 Mihail Krephchev, The Problem of Accommodating Indigenous Land Rights in
International Investment Law, 6 J. INT’L. INVESTMENT L. 42, 52 et seq. (2015); see also
James Anaya & Siegfried Wiessner, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples: Towards Re-empowerment, JURIST.ORG (Oct. 3, 2007),
http://www.jurist.org/forum/2007/10/un-declaration-on-rights-ofindigenous.php; In regard to the general application under the American
Convention on Human Rights see, Norms and Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Human
Rights System-Indigenous And Tribal Peoples’ Rights over their Ancestral Lands and Natural
Resources,
INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION
ON
HUMAN
RIGHTS,
http://cidh.org/countryrep/Indigenous-Lands09/Chap.V-VI.htm (last visited Apr.
16, 2016).
30 See the reports of the Working Group on the Right to Development
on its: Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/23, para. 43(a); Sixth session, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2005/25, para. 42; Seventh Session E/CN.4/2006/26, paras. 31, 40,
46, 67(g).
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conjunction with the community of states, to accomplish the utmost
possible within their available resources to attain the highest level of
development in their respective states, but also globally.31 The same is
true for the right to a sustainable and healthy environment. 32
Even though there is no unified global understanding of
whether and how an individual can assert the right to health, water, a
healthy environment, and a right to development (which are
categorized as second and third generation rights 33), there is no doubt
that in regard to those rights it is the state’s and the community of
states’ obligation to constantly work towards the highest fulfillment
and execution of those rights for its citizens and the global citizenry.
The right of indigenous peoples to their ancestral land is
different to the other rights discussed as it is first and foremost a
negative right. It obligates the states which are the home of
indigenous peoples to provide them with the protection not to be
deprived of their land. 34 It does not compel the particular state to
31 Ibrahim Salama, The right to development at 25: renewal and achievement of its
potential, in U.N., OFFICE OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONER, REALIZING THE
RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS IN COMMEMORATION OF 25 YEARS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT 485, 486
(2013 ).
32 John Lee, The Right to a Healthy Environment, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
283, 338 (2000); see also Draft Declaration on Human Rights and the Environment,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9, Annex I (1994), art. 22 (“All States shall
respect and ensure the right to a secure, healthy and ecologically sound
environment. Accordingly, they shall adopt the administrative, legislative and other
measures necessary to effectively implement the rights in this Declaration”).
33 See PAUL O’CONNELL, VINDICATION SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND COMPARATIVE EXPERIENCES (2012); HELENA
ALVIAR GARCIA, KARL KLARE, & LUCY WILLIAMS, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE: CRITICAL INQUIRIES (2015).
34 Compare Kaliña y Lokono v. Surinam, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 25,
2015), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_309_esp.pdf (last
visited May 10, 2016) (The ACtHR found that Suriname had violated Art 3 ACHR
by failing to recognize the collective legal personality asserted by the indigenous
and tribal people in this case. It further noted that the lack of demarcation,
delimitation, and failure to award legal title of the territory of Kaliña and Lokono
violated the villagers’ collective right to property recognized under Art 21 ACHR),
The Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No 148, paras. 169-200 (July 1, 2006) (The
Court concluded that the State violated Article 21 (right to property) to the
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progressively attain their ancestral land nor does the right require
states to work as the community of states to attain those rights.
In summary, the human rights at play on the side of citizens
are the right to health, water, a healthy environment, and the right to
development. It is generally recognized that in regard to those rights,
states have the obligation to safeguard their citizens against human
rights abuses, including those of (transnational) corporations. 35 In
particular, they are commissioned to work as part of the community
of states towards the highest possible attainment of the fulfillment of
those rights. The right of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands
has been conceptualized as a negative right, thought of as rooted in
the right to property. Its justiciability is unquestioned. 36
B. The Right of the Investor
1.

Legal Persons as Human Rights Bearers

Human rights are generally conceptualized as a safeguard for
the individual against the state. If the investor is an individual there is
no doubt human rights will extend to the investor. 37 However, the

detriment of the fifty-nine victims because its agents collaborated with the
paramilitary group to destroy the victims’ homes and steal their livestock,
unlawfully depriving them of their property.).
35 Human Rights Council, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International
Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, U.N. Doc
A/HRC/4/035, para. 19 (Feb. 19, 2007) (prepared by John Ruggie): “..the state
duty to protect against non state abuses is part of the international human rights
regime’s very foundation. The duty requires states to play a key role in regulating
and adjudicating abuse by business enterprises or risk breaching their international
obligations.”
36 E.g., Kaliña y Lokono v. Surinami, supra note 34; Sawhoyamaxa
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, para. 113(a) (Mar. 29, 2006); Yakye Axa Indigenous
Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 125, para 157(c) (June 17, 2005).
37 See, e.g., Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R.
(ser.
C)
No.
170
(Nov.
21,
2007),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_170_ing.pdf (last visited
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extension of human rights protections to legal persons is less clear.
The IBR does not afford legal persons38 protection.39 The exclusion
of legal persons from the scope of the IBR, however, does not
necessarily follow from the IBR’s purpose.40 It does correspond to
the preamble though, which asserts that human rights derive from
the inherent dignity of the human person, and with the intention of
its drafters.41
Looking more regionally, the Inter American Convention of
Human Rights (“ACHR”) does not offer rights protection to legal
persons either. 42 On the other hand, the European Convention on
Human Rights (“ECHR”) 43 and the African Charter on Human and
Peoples Rights (“ACHPR”)44 have extended rights protection, at least
in part, to legal persons.45

May 10, 2016) (The individual investors were imprisoned and their property seized
due to being suspected of drug trafficking.).
38 The term “legal person” is used for the purposes of this paper in a
rather broad sense, as including all natural entities.
39 U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, The Nature
of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 9 (Mar. 29, 2004).
40 Louis Henkin, The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global
Markets, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 17, 24-25 (1999).
41 Universal Declaration of Human Rights preamble reads “Whereas
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in
the world,…”; see also Human Rights Council, Business and Human Rights: Mapping
International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/4/035, para. 37 (Feb. 19, 2007).
42 ACHR, Art. 61(1); ACHR, Art. 1(2); Cantos v. Argentina, Preliminary
Objections, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., para. 22 et seq. (Sept. 7, 2001); Perozo v.
Venezuela, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R., paras. 74, 399 (Jan. 28, 2009).
43 ECHR, Art 34; see, e.g., Société Colas Est v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. App.
No. 37971/97, para. 41 (Apr. 16, 2002) (right to privacy in Art 8 ECHR).
44 Art. 19 v. The State of Eritrea, Decision on the Merits, Afr. Comm’n.
on Human and People’s Rights 275/ 2003 (May 2007); Civil Liberties Organization
v. Nigeria, Decision on the Merits, Afr. Comm’n. on Human and Peoples’ Rights
101/93, para 37 (1995).
45 For a full discussion on the protection of legal persons under
international and regional human rights instruments albeit in regard to their
criminal liability, see Piet Hein Van Kempen, The Recognition of Legal Persons in
International Human Rights Instruments: Protection Against and Through Criminal Justice?, in
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There is recognition that legal persons, in particular
transnational or multinational companies, should be the bearer of
(international) human rights.46 That recognition is anchored in the
fact that two regional human rights instruments afford human rights
protection to legal persons and that human rights duties of
transnational corporations have developed through soft-law
mechanisms, such as the UN Guiding Principles on Human Rights
and Business47 and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises.48 Those soft law instruments contain express provisions
on the human rights responsibilities of transnational corporations. 49
However, efforts are under way to convert those soft law instruments
into legally enforceable standards. In 2014 the Human Rights Council
with Resolution 26/9 established a working group which is tasked to
develop an international legally binding instrument to regulate the
activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises
in regard to human rights.50 The Resolution clearly identifies the
responsibility of transnational corporations and businesses to respect
human rights.51 The European Union has directed that its member
states implement the UN Guiding Principles through national action

CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY: EMERGENCE, CONVERGENCE, AND RISK, 9,
355 (Mark Pieth & Radha Ivory, 2011).
46 See Peter Oliver, Companies and their Fundamental Rights: A Comparative
Perspective, 64 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 661 (2015); see also Louis Henkin, The Universal
Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 17 (1999).
47 Guiding Principles On Business And Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS
HUMAN
RIGHTS
OFFICE
OF
THE
HIGH
COMMISSIONER,
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_
EN.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2016)
48 OECD
Guidelines
for
Multinational
Enterprises,
OECD,
http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/text/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2016).
49 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, Principle 17;
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: Recommendations for
Responsible Business Conduct in a Global Context, Part I, Chap IV Human
Rights, No 5 (May 25, 2011).
50 Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9
(July 14, 2014),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Pages/IGWGOnT
NC.aspx (last accessed April 17, 2016).
51 Id.
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plans and has incorporated the Principles in its external policy. 52 The
(growing) responsibility of transnational companies in regard to the
implementation of human rights must go hand in hand with their
right of being protected by human rights. In other words, the human
rights lobby cannot have their cake and eat it, too.53
2.

A legal person’s human rights

(i) General introduction
It is nearly trite to state that not every human right is
applicable to legal persons. The IBR rights that could be applicable to
legal persons are, inter alia, freedom of expression 54, freedom from
discrimination55, the right to freedom of movement, access to
justice56, fair trial rights 57, or the right not to be searched

52 European Commission,
Commission Staff Working Document on
Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights - State of Play,
SWD, 144 final (July 14, 2015).
53 See H.R.C. Res. 26/9, supra note 50 (acknowledging the double role of
transnational corporations and other business as having “the capacity to foster
economic well-being, development, technological improvement and wealth, as well
as causing adverse impacts on human rights”).
54 The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No.
6538/74 (1979); Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. KG v. Austria (no. 3), Eur. Ct. H.R.
App. No. 39069/97 (2003); Matter of the “Golobvision” Television Station,
Provisional Measure Regarding Venezuela, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 21, 2007).
55 Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No
18147/02 (Apr. 5, 2007); Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v. Russia, Eur. Ct.
H.R. App. No. 72881/01 (Oct. 5, 2006); also compare Alexkor Ltd. and Another v.
The Richtersveld Community and Others, S. Afr. S.C. (2003).
56 Access to justice encompasses the notion of denial of justice. Denial of
justice has been recognised as jus cogens independent from being a right contained,
as an aspect of access to justice, in the IBR. See Chevron Corporation (USA) and
Texaco Petroleum Corporation (USA) v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, Interim Award, at
2-3 (Dec. 1, 2008).
57 British-American Tobacco Company v. the Netherlands, Eur. Ct. H.R.
App. No. 19589/91 (Nov. 20, 1995); Central Mediterranean Development
Corporation Ltd. v. Malta (no. 2), Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 18544/08 (Nov. 22,
2011); Mevopal SA v. Argentina, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 39/99 (Mar.
11, 1999).
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unreasonably.58 The probably most important right for any investor
is, however, the right to property. 59 The right to property is only
protected in the UDHR60; it is not directly protected in the ICCPR or
ICESR.61 Until recently, it was general opinion that a right to
property could only arise under national law.62 However, sweeping
economic and political changes in recent decades have laid the
foundation for recognizing a global right to property. The ideological
opposition against property rights has disappeared with China,
Russia, and other socialist states having transitioned to market
economies which are premised on private property. In addition, the
globalization of trade has enhanced international support for
protecting property rights. Furthermore, the increasing recognition of
(property) rights of indigenous people has also aided a change in

See Peter Oliver, Companies and their Fundamental Rights: A Comparative
Perspective, 64 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 661 (2015), for an in-depth comparative
discussion.
59 “And while one could argue that human rights treaties are
fundamentally different from investment treaties with regard to their purpose of
the protection of individuals compared to the promotion of friendly economic
relations between two states, it should not be forgotten that a fundamental investor
right under investment treaties is the right to property, which is itself a human
right, recognized in most international human rights conventions.” HELGE
ELISABETH ZEITLER, in STEPHAN W. SCHILL (ed.), INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 199 et seq.
60 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N.
Doc. A/810, Art. 17 (1948) (“(1) [e]veryone has the right to own property alone as
well as in association with others” and “(2) no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his property”).
61 Eibe Riedel in THEORIE DER MENSCHENRECHTSSTANDARDS 39
(Dunker & Humbolt, Berlin, 1986) concludes that the travaux préparatoires
indicate that the non-inclusion of property rights in both Covenants originates in
the antagonistic ideological views of the Western and Eastern blocs, as well as
those of the North and South. See also John Sparkling, The Global Right to Property, 52
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 464, 469 (2014); Jacob Mchangama, The Right to Property
in Global Human Rights Law, Cato Policy Report (Washington, June/July 2011),
http://www.cato.org/policy-report/mayjune-2011/right-property-global-humanrights-law (last accessed Apr. 18, 2016) (article maintains a certain political angle).
62 Sparkling, supra note 61, at 464; see also Luis Valencia Rodriguez, The
Right of Everyone to Own Property Alone as Well as in Association with Others, 90 U.N.
Comm’n on H.R., UN Doc E/CN.4/1994/19 (Nov. 25, 1993).
58
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finding that property is a customary human right.63 The three regional
human rights treaties (the ECHR, the ACHPR, and the ACHR) all
protect property. 64 National constitutions and national laws
overwhelmingly protect the right to property.65 Importantly, even
though the right to property was not included in the ICCPR or the
ICESCR the omission did not equate with the states’ denial of the
right to property. As the Annotation to the Draft International
Covenant on Human Rights clearly declares, “no one questioned the
right of the individual to own property”. 66 A close reading of the
travaux préparatoires aids the conclusion that since the ideological
obstacles in regard to property ownership have been “overcome”, a
redrafted 2016 IBR would include the right to property; it would not
only exist as a principle in the UDHR.67 Therefore, as Golay and
Cismas conclude:68

In regard to the European Union countries, see: Case C-402/05 P and
C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi & Al Barakaat International Foundation v.
European Commission, 2008 E.C.R. I-06351, at 355.
64 Eur. Ct. H.R. Optional Protocol No. 1, art 1; African [Banjul] Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58
(1982), Art. 21; American Convention on Human Rights, 1114 U.N.T.S. 123, art
21. That means that 2/3 of all nations are parties to regional human rights treaties
that contain the right to property.
65 In regard to extensive discussions on the protection of the right to
property under national constitutions, see: THEO VAN BANNING, THE HUMAN
RIGHT TO PROPERTY 139-46 (Intersentia, Antwerpen, 2002). See also TOM ALLAN,
THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY IN COMMONWEALTH CONSTITUTIONS 36-82(CUP,
Cambridge, 2000); Luis Valencia Rodríquez, The right of everyone to own property alone as
well as in association with others, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/19, at 64 et seq. (Nov. 25,
1993); Christophe Golay/Ioana Cismas, The Right to Property from a Human Rights
Perspective, International Center for Human Rights and Democractic Development,
at
2.3
(legal
opinion,
2010),
http://www.genevaacademy.ch/docs/publications/ESCR/humanright-en.pdf (last accessed Apr. 18,
2016).
66 See
U.N. Docs. E/CN.4/SR.230-232; E/CN.4/SR.302, 303;
E/CN.4/SR.413-418,
para.
197,
available
at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/opinion/articles1920_iccpr/docs/A2929.pdf (last accessed Apr. 14, 2016). See also the concern expressed in U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/SR.413-418, para. 198 (“To omit [the right to property] might create the
impression that it was not a fundamental human right”).
67 U.N.
Docs.
E/CN.4/SR.230-232;
E/CN.4/SR.302,
303;
E/CN.4/SR.413-418,
para.
197-212,
available
at
63
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The review of provisions of international instruments,
regional treaties and national constitutions reveal the universal
recognition of the human right to property. It appears that
generalized and consistent State practice and opinio juris reflect the
customary nature of the first paragraph of Article 17 of the UDHR
‘everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association
with others’”.
(ii) The ambit of the right to property
An important question is what the right to property entails.
Any attempt to discuss the ambit of the right to property in a
comprehensive manner would go well beyond the scope of this
article.69 The following sets out the basic features of the ambit of the
right to property.
The UN General Assembly has stated that the right to
property extends to both “[p]ersonal property, including the
residence of one’s self and family”70 and “[e]conomically productive
property, including property associated with agriculture, commerce
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/opinion/articles1920_iccpr/docs/A2929.pdf (last accessed Apr. 14, 2016).
68 Christophe Golay/Ioana Cismas, The Right to Property from a Human
Rights Perspective, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic
Development, at 2.4 (legal opinion, 2010 ) http://www.genevaacademy.ch/docs/publications/ESCR/humanright-en.pdf (last accessed Apr. 18,
2016); see also Sparkling, supra note 61, who extensively and detailed discusses the
right to property as a right recognized as international law. Denying the jus cogens
quality of the right to property, Joern Axel Kaemmerer, Der Schutz des Eigentums im
Voelkerrecht, (Apr. 20, 2016) (denying the jus cogens quality of the right to
property),
https://www.unitrier.de/fileadmin/fb5/inst/IRP/Bitburger_Gespraeche_Einzeldokumente/Bitbur
gerGespr_2004_I_Kaemmerer_151_175_geschuetzt.pdf.
69 See, e.g., URSULA KRIEBAUM, EIGENTUMSSCHUTZ IM VOELKERRECHT
(Duncker & Humbolt, Berlin, 2008); THEO VAN BANNING, THE HUMAN RIGHT
TO PROPERTY (Intersentia, Antwerpen, 2002); RUDOLF DOLZER, EIGENTUM,
ENTEIGNUNG UND ENTSCHÄDIGUNG IM GELTENDEN VÖLKERRECHT (Springer,
Heidelberg, 1985); Adolph A. Berle, Property, Production and Revolution, 6 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 1-20 (1965); generally, FRIEDRICH CARL V. SAVIGNY, DAS RECHT DES
BESITZES (Heyer, Gießen, 1803).
70 U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/98, para. 3 (Dec. 14 1990).
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and industry”71 In the absence of the right to property being
stipulated by the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee has not dealt
with the right directly.72 The Inter American Court of Human Rights
and the European Court of Human Rights, on the other hand, have
filled the relative void under the respective Covenants.73 According to
their jurisprudence, the right to property encompasses a wide range
of economic interests like movable and immovable property; tangible
and intangible interests, such as shares, an arbitration award and
intellectual property;74 pension rights75; a business operation76; a
customer base77; vested, asset like, rights78; a license or concession79;
and the right to exercise a profession80

Id.
The Human Rights Committee dealt with the right to property in the
negative. E.g., Kéténguéré Ackla v. Togo, Communication No. 505/1992, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/505/1992, 1996, para. 6.3 (“the Committee noted that,
irrespective of the fact that the confiscation took place prior to the date of entry
into force of the Optional Protocol for Togo, the right to property was not
protected by the Covenant. Accordingly, the Committee decided that this claim was
inadmissible ratione materiae, under article 3 of the Optional Protocol”).
73 In regard to an overview of the jurisprudence of the European Court
of Human Rights, see: Helene Ruiz Fabri, Approach taken by the European Court of
Human Rights to the Assessment of Compensation for Regulatory Exprorpriations of the
Property of Foreign Investors, 11 N.Y.U. ENVIR. L. J. 148 (2012); in regard to the
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: LAURENCE
BURGORGUE-LARSEN & AMAYA UBEDA DE TORRES, THE INTER-AMERICAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (OUP, Oxford, 2011).
74 Lithgow v. United Kingdom, 1986 ECHR 8 (1986); Ivcher Bronstein
Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 74 (Feb. 6, 2001), available at http://wwwl
.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/74-ing.html; Palamara-Iribarne v. Chile, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, (ser. C) No. 135, para. 96 (Nov. 22, 2005); Salvador
Chiriboga v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections and Merits, (ser. C) No. 179 (May 6,
2008).
75 Azinas v. Cyprus, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 56679/00 (Apr. 28, 2004);
Torres Benvenuto et al v. Peru (Five Pensioners Case), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
98 (Feb. 28, 2003); Acevedo Buendía et al (Discharged and Retired Employees of the
Office of the Comptroller) v. Peru, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 198, para. 80–91 (July 1, 2009).
76 Van Marle v. Netherlands, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 8543/79; 8674/79;
8675/79; 8685/79 (June 26, 1986)
77 Latridis v. Greece, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 31107/96, ECHR 1999-II
75 (Mar. 25, 1999).
78 Holy Monastries v. Greece, Eur. Ct. H.R., 20 EHHR 1 (1995).
71
72
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Importantly the ECHR has extended the concept of
protected property to rights arising from contracts and other types of
claims81, including, for example, claims to restitution under national
law82 Furthermore, the Court has held that a legitimate expectation
of a property right is protected under Article 1(1) Optional Protocol
to the ECHR. In Slivenko v Latvia the Court stated:83
[p]ossessions” can be “existing possessions” or assets,
including claims by virtue of which the applicant can
argue that he or she has at least a “legitimate
expectation” of acquiring effective enjoyment of a
property right.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has summarized
the right to property as84

Tre Traktörer AB Garamond v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R., A159, para. 53
(1989); Fredin v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R., 13 EHRR 784 (Feb. 18, 2991).
80 Gospodinova v. Bulgaria, Eur. Comm’n H.R. App. No. 37912/97
(Apr. 16, 1998) (decision on admissibility); Jantner v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App.
No. 39050/97, para. 34 (Mar. 4, 2003); Kopecký v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App.
No. 44912/98 (GC) 2004-IX, para. 35 (2004); von Maltzan et al v. Germany, Eur.
Ct. H.R. App. No. 71916/01, 71917/01, 10260/02, para. 74 (Mar. 2 2005) (decision
on admissibility).
81 Compare, e.g., Pressos Compania Naviera SA v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R.
21 EHHR 301 (1995) (tort claim); Monica Carss-Frisk, A guide to the implementation of
Artice 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights, Human Rights
Handbooks, No. 4, para. 29 et seq. (Strasbourg, 2001).
82 Compare, e.g., Kirilova and Others v. Bulgaria, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No.
42908/98 et al: (June 9, 2005) (final, Sept. 9 2005), and (June 14, 2007) (final, Sept.
14, 2007).
83 Slivenko and Others v. Latvia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 48321/99, (GC)
ECHR 2002-II, para. 121 (2002); see also, Vander Mussele v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R.
App. No. 8919/80 (ser. A) 70, para. 48 (1983); Pine Valley Developments Ltd. v.
Ireland, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 12742/87 (ser. A) 222 (1991).
84 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of
Aug. 31, 2001, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, para. 144; see also, Yakye Axa
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (June 17, 2005); Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Mar. 29, 2006); Saramaka People v.
Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 172 (Nov. 28, 2007).
79
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those material things which can be possessed, as well
as any right which may be part of a person’s
patrimony; that concept includes all moveables and
immovables, corporeal and incorporeal elements and
any other intangible object capable of having value.
What is not protected is the right or guarantee to acquire
property in the future.85
It is undisputed that the right to property protects the right’s
bearer from the direct expropriation of their property. 86 Right’s
bearers are also protected from a de facto deprivation of property. 87
As the ECHR observed:88
In the absence of formal expropriation, that is to say a
transfer of ownership, the Court considers that it
must look behind the appearances and investigate the
realities of the situation complained of . . . Since the
Convention is intended to guarantee rights that are
“practical and effective” . . . it has to be ascertained
whether th[e] situation amount[s] to a de facto
expropriation….
(iii) Summary
In the present day, not only individual investors but also
corporations have to be afforded human rights. The inclusion of
(transnational) legal persons in the protection sphere of international
human rights has to be the consequence of requiring corporations to
Marckx v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 6833/74 (1979); X v. the
Federal Republic of Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 8410/78 (1979).
86 Ursula Kriebaum & Christoph Schreuer, The Concept of Property in
Human Rights Law and International Investment Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY
AND THE RULE OF LAW: LIBER AMICORUM LUZIUS WILDHABER 748 (Zurich,
2007),
available
at
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/88_concept_property.pdf
(last
accessed Apr. 18, 2016) (p. 5 of the linked publication)
87 Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 7152/75
(1982); Monica Carss-Frisk, supra note 81, para. 67 et seq.
88 Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, supra note 87, para. 63.
85
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be protectors of human rights. The most important right for an
investor, the right to property, has attained customary international
law status. At this point in time the ambit of the right has to be
ascertained through the analysis of (especially) the European Court of
Human Rights and the Inter American Court of Human Rights
jurisprudence. Such an analysis reveals that the right to property
extensively protects the economic interests of corporations in regard
to direct, and importantly also de facto expropriation, and the
curtailment of the use and enjoyment of their property. 89 The right to
property protects the physical assets of a corporation but also its
intangible assets. Importantly, the right to property also protects the
business operation including legitimate expectations.
3.

Conclusion

Both citizens as well as investors are afforded rights under
international human rights law. However, at this point in time the
state’s citizens’ enjoyment of human rights is on more solid
foundations than those of legal persons in general and investors in
particular. Citizens’ rights most likely to be at stake in an investorstate dispute are so called second and third generation rights. Those
rights are enshrined in the ICESCR or rights which have attained
customary international law status. Even though generally their
justiciability is not without doubt, it is generally accepted that those
rights demand a constant progressive realization from states.90 For
most investors, their human rights protection will depend on the
acknowledgment that they can, as legal persons, be bearers of
international human rights, in particular the IBR. Since
(transnational) corporations are relied upon for the progressive
realization of human rights, those obligations must come with the
right to be a human rights bearer. A number of rights which have
89 See European Court of Human Rights, Factsheet: Companies-Victims or
Culprits (July 2013); Ursula Kriebaum & Christoph Schreuer, supra note 86
(discussing the differences between investment law and human rights law in regard
to the issues arising in the limitation of the investor’s economic interest. However,
the different treatment does not necessitates a different outcome in regard to
protection).
90 See above II.A. in regard to the concept of the states’ duty to
progressive realization.
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been or could be the focus of human rights violations by the state are
ICCPR rights which are unquestionably justiciable. The right to
property, which is undoubtedly the most important right to be
upheld for the investor, has come into its own and has achieved at
least near customary international law status. Therefore, international
human rights law does afford investors protection in regard to the
investment they have made.
No human rights bearer, however, holds their rights
absolutely. Article 29(2) of the UDHR generally acknowledges that,
in the exercise of
rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to
such limitations as are determined by law solely for
the purpose of securing due recognition and respect
for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting
the just requirements of morality, public order and
the general welfare in a democratic society.
Some rights in the IBR have specific limitations.91 Whether
specific limitations apply to the right to property is at this point in
time not generally recognized since the right to property has just
emerged on the international plane. Guidance can again be sought
from the ECHR and the ACHR. Article 1 of the Optional Protocol
No 1 to the ECHR 92 grants the state the possibility to limit the
individual’s right to property due to public interest. The ACHR also
allows the limitation of the right to property due to public interest.

The right to freedom of expression (art. 19(2), ICCPR), for example,
can be limited when it is necessary for the country’s national security (art. 19(3)(b)).
92 Optional Protocol No 1, Art. 1 reads: “Every natural or legal person is
entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided
for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding
provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such
laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or
penalties.” See Yukos v. Russia, Judgement, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 14902/04,
para. 554 (Sept. 20, 2011), in regard to the general interpretation of Art. 1.
91
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The ACHR only allows a limitation to the right to property for just
compensation. 93
The citizen’s rights in question are rights that require a
progressive realization by the state.94 To justify preventing the
realization of one right at the expense of another right, the realization
must be reasonable.95 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss
the limitations on the right to property and the citizen’s rights at any
length. For the purpose of this article it is important to state that
neither the investor’s rights nor those of the citizens are absolute.
Human rights law has developed internal limitation mechanisms to
take account of the fact that the individual’s enjoyment of rights take
place within the community of other rights holders.
In addition to internally accepted limitations on a right, the
commonly used analytical framework to balance the rights of human
ACHR, Art. 21(2) : “No one shall be deprived of his property except
upon payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest,
and in the cases and according to the forms established by law.” In Salvador
Chiriboga v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 179 (May 6, 2008), the city
had expropriated applicant’s land for use as a public park but failed to pay any
compensation. The Court held that the public interest or social utility standard was
satisfied since the park provided a recreational and ecological protected area for the
benefit of city residents. However, the Court found a violation of the right to
property due to the city’s failure to comply with expropriation procedures required
under domestic law (i.e., failure to pay compensation). The Court also observed that
a restriction on the right to property must be proportionate to the legitimate
interest that justifies it, which requires a fair balance between the interests of the
public and owner. The ECtHR also generally requires compensation for a
limitation of the right to property. James et al v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R.
App. No. 8793/79 (ser. A) No. 98, para. 54 (Feb. 21, 1986) (“[T]he taking of
property in the public interest without payment of compensation is treated as
justifiable only in exceptional circumstances not relevant for present purposes”);
Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 9006/80 et
al., para. 120 (July 8, 1986) (“[T]he taking of property in the public interest without
payment of compensation is treated as justifiable only in exceptional
circumstances”)..
94 See above II.B.2.(i).
95 The principle of reasonableness as an inherent limit of socio-economic
rights has been best developed by the South African Constitutional Court, see
Khosa v. Minister of Social Development, 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) (Mar. 4, 2004); see
also, Kevin Iles, Limiting Socio-Economic Rights: Beyond the Internal Limitation Clause, 20
S. AFR. J. OF HUM. RTS. 448 (2004).
93
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rights holders to allow for the fullest human rights fulfillment is
proportionality. Proportionality has been received inter alia into the
constitutional doctrine of courts in continental Europe96, the United
Kingdom97, Canada98, New Zealand99, Israel100, South Africa101, and
the United States102, as well as the jurisprudence of treaty-based legal
systems such as the European Convention on Human Rights 103, the
American Convention on Human Rights, 104 the European Court of
Justice,105 and the ICCPR106107 The core proportionality analysis
requires the following inquiries to be made:
a)

Is there a legitimate aim in regard to the measure in
question?

b) Is the measure suitable to achieve the aim?
E.g., Bundesverfasungsgericht 1 BvR 2378/98 (Mar. 3, 2004) (police
surveillance powers in regard to living space).
97 R (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL
26; Huang v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11;
Kashmiri v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11.
98 R v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.).
99 R v. Hansen [2007] N.Z.S.C. 7, para. 102 (N.Z.).
100 CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village
49(4) PD 221, 353 (1995) (Isr.).
101 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.).
102 In regard to the United States, see Iddo Porat, Mapping the American
Debate over Balancing in GRANT HUSCROFT/BRADLEY MILLER/GREGOIRE WEBBER,
PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 397 (CUP, Cambridge, 2016).
103 Handyside v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., [1976] ECHR 5 (Dec.
7, 1976); Soering v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R., 11 EHRR 439 (1989); Helene
Ruiz Fabri, Approach taken by the European Court of Human Rights to the Assessment of
Compensation for Regulatory Exprorpriations of the Property of Foreign Investors (2002) 11
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 148, 163 (2002).
104 Compare IACHR, Art. 27(1) and discussion in YUTAKA ARAITAKASHI, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLE OF
PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR 186 (intersentia,
Antwerp, 2001).
105 E.g., Sky Österreich, E.C.J. (GC) C-283/11, para. 50 et seq. (Jan. 22,
2013).
106 U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, para. 6
(Mar. 29, 2004).
107 For an in depth discussion on the framework of proportionality in
different jurisdictions, see GRANT HUSCROFT, BRADLEY MILLER and GREGOIRE
WEBBER, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW (CUP, Cambridge, 2016).
96
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Is the measure necessary to achieve the aim?

d) Is the measure the least rights infringing means to
achieve the aim?
e)

Considering the competing interests of the different
rights bearers at hand is the measure proportional?

The human rights framework demands a balancing of the
investor’s rights with the rights of the citizens, i.e. the state’s right to
make public policy decisions to safeguard its citizens’ rights. The
human rights framework internally limits a state’s measure in regard
to the realization of the rights in question, like the right to health or
water. The proportionality paradigm gives the balancing a tested
structure. It is therefore curious that a review of arbitral awards
reveals that arbitral tribunals have turned a blind eye to the human
rights of the state’s citizens, as an extensive study by Jason Fry
determined.108 The argument generally advanced is that the arbitral
tribunal gets its power by virtue of the parties set out in an
investment treaty between the host state and the investor’s state. And
as long as the investment treaty does not stipulate an authority for the
investment tribunal to have regard to the citizens’ human rights,
tribunals do not have the authority to do so. 109 That has resulted in,
as Bruno Simma put it:110
a problem of aiming at two moving targets: for the
foreign investor, how to accurately estimate the
political risks of the investment before, or at the time
of, its establishment in the host State so as to enable
the investor to price the contract cost correctly
according to its projected returns on investment; and
for the host State, how to determine the optimal
degree of police powers and regulatory authority to be
retained during the life of the investment, needed to
perform its international human rights obligations.
Jason Fry, International Human Rights Law in Investment Arbitration:
Evidence of International Law’s Unity, 18 DUKE J. OF COMP. & INT’L L. 77 (2007).
109 Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place for Human
Rights?, 60 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 573, 582 (2011).
110 Id. at 579.
108
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The non-use of the human rights framework by arbitral
tribunals is problematic. The reason is that the right which is at the
heart of investment arbitration – the right to access to justice – is the
right which puts the investor, at least sometimes, in a better position
than a state’s citizens. In a country with a non-functioning
adjudication system111 the investors, unlike the citizens, have through
investor-state arbitration an avenue open to them that allows access
to justice to independent adjudicators who are outside that nonfunctioning adjudication system. In this inequality lies the potential
human rights violation of investor-state arbitration but also the
potential for investor-state arbitration.
C. International Arbitration Approaches
Having set out the human rights framework applicable to the
investor-state relationship the paper will briefly set out the currently
proposed approaches of how tribunals can be compelled to take
human rights into account.
1.

Current Approaches

Broadly speaking three approaches are advanced. All
approaches are centered on the investment treaty. They have as their
underlying premise that human rights can only be taken into account
if, and as far as, an investment tribunal is allowed to consider rules of
international law. They allow any kind of human rights analysis only
in so far as human rights can be placed in a particular relationship
with the investment treaty concerned. 112 The core premise of those
approaches is illustrated by the travaux prepartoires of Article 42(1) of
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID
Convention) which refers to “such rules of international law as may
be agreed by the parties.”113

“non- functioning” for the purposes of this article is meant in the
widest sense including a legal system that does grant effective justice.
112 See Bruno Simma, supra note 109, at 581-82.
113 ICSID Report of the Executive Directors, I ICSID Rep. 31 (2006)
(emphasis added) (cited in CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A
111
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(i) Explicit Referencing Approach
The first approach advanced is to draft (in the future)
investment treaties that clearly state that a tribunal has to take the
state’s human rights commitments into account. 114 Among the rare
investment treaties that do make reference to human rights already,
human rights are addressed in two different ways none of which
gives the tribunal an explicit mandate to incorporate a human rights
analysis into its decision making process. First, certain treaty clauses,
such as Article 1114(1) of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), allow a host state under its respective regimes
to enact measures aimed at protecting human rights.115 However,
such measures are only allowed to the extent that they are consistent
with the terms of the investment treaty.116 Second, other treaty
clauses provide that the provisions of the investment treaty do not
limit the regulatory power of states regarding the protection of
human rights. Article 10(1) of the Canadian BIT Model provides
such an example.117 The Comprehensive Economic and Trade
COMMENTARY 609 (CUP, Cambridge, 2001)). Pursuant to the report by the
Executive Directors, the term ‘international law’ as used in the context of the
Convention has to be understood in the sense given to it by Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. In light of this statement, the
applicable rules of international law are those contained in treaties, customary law,
and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. Therefore, under the
ICSID Convention the IBR has to be taken into account if the investment treaty
makes reference to international law.
114 Bruno Simma, supra note 109, at 579.
115 See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art.
1114(1), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
116
NAFTA, art 1114(1) (“Nothing in this Chapter [11] shall be
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure
otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it considers appropriate to ensure that
investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to
environmental concern”) (emphasis added).
117 Model Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments,
art. 10(1) (2004): “Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in
a manner that would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
investments or between investors, or a disguised restriction on international trade
or investment, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party
from adopting or enforcing measures necessary: (a) to protect human, animal or
plant
life
or
health.”
Available
at
http://www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf
(last
accessed 3 April 2016); see also the Norwegian Draft Model BIT (2015), which has
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Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union as a
recent instance includes a clause which protects human rights
explicitly.118 Those express references to the state’s ability to regulate
with the aim to foster human rights are stating the obvious. As set
out in the previous part of this paper states are compelled by the IBR
to attain the highest standard in human rights compliance for their
citizens. A reminder of that in an investment treaty is undoubtedly
useful. In addition what is proposed is to clearly state in an
investment treaty a tribunal’s ability to weigh the state’s aim to foster
human rights compliance through its social and economic policy
against the investor’s right to its investment.
In regard to existing investment treaties two approaches have
been proposed:
(ii) Dynamic Interpretation Approach
The first approach promulgates a dynamic interpretation as
set out by the International Court of Justice in Kasiliki, Sedudu Island
(Botswana v Namibia):119 where treaties use known legal terms whose
content the parties expected would change through time, 120 the
meaning of these terms will be determined by reference to
international law as it has evolved and stands at present, rather than
to the state of the law at the time of the conclusion of the treaty. 121

an equivalent to art. 10 in its art. 25. In addition, art. 31 reads: “The Parties agree to
encourage investors to conduct their investment activities in
compliance with the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and to participate in the United
Nations Global Compact.”
118 Consolidated Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement Text,
EU-Canada, Oct. 30, 2016, Annex 8-E (“. . . . the Parties confirm their
understanding that measures that are ‘related to the maintenance of international
peace and security’ include the protection of human rights”), available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf (last
accessed Feb. 15, 2017).
119 Kasiliki, Sedudu Island (Botswana v Namibia), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J.
Rep. 1045.
120 Id. at 2 (Declaration of Judge Rosalyn Higgins).
121 The same technic was utilized in Ronald Lauder v. Czech Republic,
Final
Award
of
Sept.
3,
2001,
at
para.
200,
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The European Court of Human Rights applies this principle as a
matter of routine, basing it inter alia on articles 31(1) and 31(2) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.122
(iii) Interpretative Presumption Approach
The other school of thought emphasizes the interpretative
presumption that treaties are intended to produce effects which
accord with existing rules of international law.123 This presumption is
used to resolve issues of interpretation relating to the broader
normative content of a treaty rather than to the meaning of a specific
term. This argument is based on article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties124 which states that in the
interpretation of a treaty between the parties has to take account of
“[a]ny relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties.” However, as Bruno Simma points out article
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention can only be employed as a means
of harmonization qua interpretation, and not for the purpose of
modification, of an existing treaty.
2.

The Human Rights Centric Approach

However, is the Vienna Convention on Treaties really the
glue that prevents international law to disintegrate into a 1000 pieces?
In domestic law the respective constitution (generally containing a
human rights catalogue) is allowed comfortably to be the overarching
umbrella that gives the law legitimacy and provides a framework in
what the state but also its citizens can engage in and are allowed to
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0451.pdf
(last
accessed Feb. 15, 2017).
122 See, e.g., SE Golder v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No
4451/70, Report of the Commission, CE doc. D-60-355, 25 (June 1, 1973); also Id.,
Judgment, 29-36 (Feb. 21, 1975).
123 Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v.
India), Preliminary Objections, 1957 I.C.J. Rep. 142; Corfu Channel case (U.K. v.
Albania), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 104.
124 See also Ciaran Cross & Christian Schliemann-Radbruch, When
Investment Arbitration curbs Domestic Regulatory Space: Consistent Solutions through Amicus
Curiae Submissions by Regional Organisations, 6 L & DEV. REV. 67, 87 (2013).
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do. On the international plane this paper argues the IBR provides
this overarching umbrella. The IBR sets out the paradigm in which
states but also the arbitrators and the investors have to operate in. If
states would not have to adhere to the IBR (and as stated at the
beginning since those rights embodied in the IBR are customary so
every state has to adhere to them) then human rights protection
would be illusory. The IBR has to be treated as jus congens by any
tribunal in investment treaties decisions. Article 53 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that “a treaty is void if,
at the time its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of
general international law.” The general principle that is extrapolated is
that domestic as well as international law follows a hierarchy whereby
treaty obligations are of no effect in the event that they conflict with
a fundamental jus congens.125 The IBR contains the most globally
recognized norms. International investment law itself should not be
blind to human rights.126 By signing an investment treaty states
cannot relieve themselves from any human rights obligation towards
their citizens. It should not matter whether the state includes human
rights protection in those treaties or not. It cannot lie in the hands of
the states or the investors whether human rights are applicable. 127
Regarding that international investment law constitutes a public law
discipline128, neither states nor investors can “flee into private law”129
Luke Eric Peterson & Kevin R. Gray, International Human Rights in
Bilateral Investment Treaties and in Investment Treaty Arbitration 18 (International
Institute for Sustainable Development Research Paper, Apr. 2004),
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_int_human_rights_bits.pdf
(last
accessed Feb. 15, 2017).
126 Filip Balcerzak, Jurisdiction of Tribunals in Investor–State Arbitration and the
Issue of Human Rights, 29 ICSID Rev. 216, at VI (2016),
https://academic.oup.com/icsidreview/article/29/1/216/2356645/Jurisdictionof-Tribunals-in-Investor-State (last accessed Feb. 15, 2017).
127 For a different opinion, see Tamar Meshel, Human Rights in InvestorState Arbitration: The Human Right to Water and Beyond, 6 J. OF INT’L DISP.
SETTLEMENT
277,
281
(2015),
https://academic.oup.com/jids/article/6/2/277/819997/Human-Rights-inInvestor-State-Arbitration-The (last accessed Feb. 15, 2017), who points out in his
conclusion that the highest responsibility for human rights protection bears the
state while building an investment treaty, even though he recognizes the possible
influence of investment arbitration tribunals regardless of investment treaties
clauses at least for the human right to water.
128 STEPHAN W. SCHILL, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 17 et al. (2010).
125
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when it comes to violation of basic general law principles.130 The
ability of states to contract out, even partially, of the IBR would
seriously undermine human rights protection globally. As set out
above under B the IBR provides not only protection for citizens but
also for the investor. And also the arbitrator is part of the paradigm
as Lalive so clearly pointed out:131
While he is clearly not an organ of the State, the
international arbitrator is not acting in a legal vacuum
and is not called upon to decide, so to speak, as if he
did not belong to this world! The question may be
raised here, in passing [ . . . ] whether the arbitrator is
not, perhaps, the organ of the international
community, be it the community of States or the
‘international community of businessmen’ (in which
more and more States and State organs appear to be
active) or both international communities.
The investor-state relationship illustrates the private-public
divide on the international plane. The private-public divide, i.e. when
is a state action private when public, is one of the most contested in
every jurisdiction.132 One of the fundamental issues is that the
Compare the principle in German Public Law “keine Flucht ins
Privatrecht”, see Ferdinand Kirchhof, Art. 83, n.103, in GRUNDGESETZKOMMENTAR, 78 (Maunz & Dürig eds., Sept. 2016); Thorsten Kingreen, AEUV
Art. 36, n.111, in EUV/AEUV 5 (Calliess & Ruffert eds., 2016).
130 Compare Wolfgang Friedmann, The Use of “General Principles” in the
Development of International Law, 57 AM. J. INT’L L. 279, 295 (Apr., 1963) (“The
science of international law can no longer be content with the analogous
application of private law categories. It must search the entire body of the ‘general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ for proper analogies. With the
growing importance of international legal relations between public authorities and
private legal subjects, public law will be an increasingly fertile source of
international law”).
131 Pierre Lalive, Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and
International Arbitration, in COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN ARBITRATION, ICCA Congress Series No. 3 at 258, 302 (1986).
132 For an overview of the German discussion, See Ulrich Stelkens, The
Public-Private Divide: Annual Report – 2010 – Germany, IUS PUBLICUM
NETWORK
REV.
(Nov.
2011),
http://www.iuspublicum.com/repository/uploads/23_11_2011_10_39_Stelkens.pdf (last accessed
May 28, 2016), for an overview of the German discussion. For an overview of the
129
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arbitration community seems to view the investor-state relationship
from a private law lens centering its analysis of the relationship
between in the investor and the state solely on the investment treaty.
The investment treaty, a treaty between two or more states, does
have to be the starting point of the analysis. The object of an
investment treaty is to attract investment, i.e. business, something
commonly associated with private law. However, only because the
subject matter of the treaty is private does not mean that public law
principles, i.e. human rights, do not apply to its interpretation. As the
German Constitutional Court has convincingly and regularly stated: a
state cannot resort to a private measure to circumvent its human
rights commitments since otherwise human rights protection would
be illusive.133
To accept the proposed paradigm in this article would mean
that human rights, as enshrined in the IBR, have to be taken into
account by the arbitral tribunal whether or not there is an
interpretative “hole” or “hook” in the respective investment treaty.
Human rights are the structure in which the investment treaty is fixed
to and which ultimately limits it. In other words, the paradigm
proposed is the opposite paradigm of, what is at this stage, the
general opinion where the investment treaty provides the structure in
which human rights have to find a hook to be able to find hold in
that structure. Thereby, while balancing the interests of the investor
against the interests of the citizens, arbitrators not only harmonize
two potentially conflicting regimes of international law (investment
law and human rights law) but, in substance, also highlight the human
dimension of investment law.134

discussion regarding the United Kingdom, see Dawn Oliver, common values in public
and private law and the public/private divide, in BA Rider (ed), LAW AT THE CENTRE 119
(Kluwer, London, 1999); see generally Christine Chinkin, A Critique of the Public/Private
Dimension, 10 EUR. J. INT’’L LAW 387 (1999); LAW COMMISSION OF CANADA, NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DIVIDE (2007).
133 See BVerfGE 15, 256, 262; BVerfGE 21, 362, 369, 370; BVerfGE 115,
205, 237.
134 Yannik Radi, Realizing Human Rights in Investment Treaty Arbitration: A
Perspective from within the International Investment Law Toolbox, N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM.
REG. 1107, 1114 (2011).
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D. Conclusion
An analysis of the international human rights framework
demonstrates that states’ citizens as well as the foreign investors are
human rights bearers. Human rights methodology provides for a
balancing of conflicting rights’ positions. The current inclusion of
human rights into the decision making of arbitral tribunals occurs
through an investment treaty centered interpretation. That general
approach limits the tribunal’s ability, if not discourages, to consider
the relevant human rights of citizens and investors alike in its
decision-making. Arbitrators are part of the international community
and their mandate is not only determined by their appointment and
the relevant investment treaty provisions but also by the international
constitutional framework, i.e. the applicable human rights norms.
Even if an arbitral tribunal would ignore an exciting investment treaty
a human rights analysis would not disregard the rights of the investor.
Therefore, if a human rights analysis does not differ in its outcome
significantly from the analyses of tribunals under the relevant
investment treaty then it evidences that an arbitral tribunal does not
have to fear the inclusion of a human rights analysis in its decisionmaking process. On the contrary, an inclusion of a human rights
analysis will aid the decision-making process and most importantly
will foster a constructive dialogue with the human rights lobby and
thereby would promote the legitimacy of investment arbitration.
III. THE CASE
Investors have successfully sought relief in front of regional
human rights courts135 and domestic courts136 for government
interference with their investment. An analysis in light of the
international human rights framework adds an important dimension.
135 See, e.g., Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R.
(ser.
C)
no.
170
(Nov.
21,
2007),
available
at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_170_ing.pdf (last accessed
May 10, 2016); Oao Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App.
No. 14902/04 (Mar. 8, 2012).
136 See
Overview
in
Helene
Brubowski,
Internationale
Investionsschiedsverfahren und nationale Gerichte, Jus Internationale et Europaeum 79
(Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2013).
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As set out earlier the international human rights framework provides
the global human rights standard available to every international
arbitral tribunal by virtue of being international. It provides the
globally accepted minimum human rights standard.
The general way human rights cases are approached are by
defining the ambit of the right that is potentially infringed and once
an infringement is established to balance the limiting of that right
with the rights of other rights holders since it is accepted that rights
can be justifiably limited by the rights of others. In the following that
methodology will be applied to TECMED v Mexico.137 The tribunals
approach in the judgement was also followed by other tribunals later
on, for example, in Azurix v Argentina.138
A. The Investment Arbitration Tribunal Decision
TECMED, a Spanish company with its two Mexican
subsidiaries, brought a claim against Mexico alleging several
violations of the Spain-Mexico BIT. The claim concerned
TECMED’s investment in a hazardous waste landfill site acquired in
1996. TECMED alleged that Mexico failed to renew a license for the
site.
In the investment arbitration proceedings TECMED alleged
the failure to renew the license rendered the investment completely
lost, as it did not have any economic value as an ongoing business.
TECMED alleged violations of the BIT, including expropriation, fair
and equitable treatment and full protection and security. The tribunal
found that Mexico’s action in effect expropriated TECMED’s
investment, and that it failed to provide fair and equitable treatment.
The Tribunal interestingly did balance Mexico’s interest in its

137 TECMED v Mexico, ICSID Case no. ARB(AF)/00/2 (May 29, 2003)
(the author chose this case as one of the earlier cases where the arbitral tribunal
payed regard to balancing the rights of the investor against the rights of Mexico’s
citizens).
138 Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12,
Award of July 14, 2006, para. 311, http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/casedocuments/ita0061.pdf (last accessed Feb. 15, 2017).

363

2017

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

5:2

environment and the investor’s right to property. The Tribunal
stated:139
After establishing that regulatory actions and
measures will not be initially excluded from the
definition of expropriatory acts, in addition to the
negative financial impact of such actions or measures,
the Arbitral Tribunal will consider, in order to
determine if they are to be characterized as
expropriatory, whether such actions or measures are
proportional to the public interest presumably
protected thereby and to the protection legally
granted to investments, taking into account that the
significance of such impact has a key role upon
deciding the proportionality. Although the analysis
starts at the due deference owing to the State when
defining the issues that affect its public policy or the
interests of society as a whole, as well as the actions
that will be implemented to protect such values, such
situation does not prevent the Arbitral Tribunal,
without thereby questioning such due deference, from
examining the actions of the State in light of Article
5(1) of the Agreement to determine whether such
measures are reasonable with respect to their goals,
the deprivation of economic rights and the legitimate
expectations of who suffered such deprivation. There
must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the charge or weight imposed to the foreign
investor and the aim sought to be realized by any
expropriatory measure. To value such charge or
weight, it is very important to measure the size of the
ownership deprivation caused by the actions of the
state and whether such deprivation was compensated
or not. On the basis of a number of legal and practical
factors, it should be also considered that the foreign
TECMED v Mexico, supra note 137, at para. 122. Also recently
quoted in Philip Morris v. Uruguay, ICSID Case no. ARB(AF)/10/7, para. 295
(July 8, 2016), where it stressed that the tribunal relied on the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights, based on Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the
Convention..
139
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investor has a reduced or nil participation in the
taking of the decisions that affect it, partly because
the investors are not entitle to exercise political rights
reserved to the nationals of the State, such as voting
for the authorities that will issue the decisions that
affect such investors.
B. The Human Rights Tribunal Decision
This paper will limit its human rights analysis to the right to
property.
1.

Ambit of the right infringed?

The first step in a human rights analysis is to define the ambit
of the right that is potentially involved to determine whether the act
or omission is protected by the right. As discussed under II.B.2.(ii).
the right to property encompasses a license140 as well as legitimate
expectations in proprietary positions141 In TECMED the investor
sustained a complete loss of the profits and income from the
economic and commercial operation of the landfill as an ongoing
business. The damage sustained included the impossibility of
recovering the cost incurred in the acquisition of assets for the
landfill, its adaptation and preparation and, more generally, the
investments relating to or required for this kind of industrial activity.
That included, but was not limited to, constructions relating to the
landfill; lost profits and business opportunities; the impossibility of
performing contracts entered into with entities producing industrial
waste. Thus the government’s action lead to the termination of such
contracts and to possible claims relating thereto. Furthermore, the
government’s action resulted in a loss of reputation for TECMED

140 Compare Tre Traktörer ABGaramond v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R. App.
No. 10873/84, para. 53 (1989); Fredin v. Sweden, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No.
12033/86 (1991); Latridis v. Greece, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 31107/96 (1999).
141 Compare Slivenko v. Latvia, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 48321/99 (2003),
para. 121; see also Vander Mussele v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 8919/80
(ser. A), para. 48 (1983); Pine Valley Developments Ltd. v. Ireland, 222 Eur. Ct.
H.R. App. No. 12742/87 (ser. A) (1991).
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and to its subsidiaries in Mexico. The consequence was a negative
impact on TECMED’s capacity to expand and develop its activities
in Mexico. Even though the government did not expropriate
TECMED its actions rendered the property of TECMED de facto
useless. In addition, TECMED’s expectation in the license and the
license itself are protected by the right to property. Therefore,
TECMED’s activities and expectations in regard to the operation of
the landfill were protected by the customary right to property.
TECMED’s right to its property was infringed by the actions of
Mexico’s government. As set out above under II.B.2.(ii). the right to
property can be limited if the property owner is compensated fairly
for the expropriation.142 If the state compensates fairly for the
expropriation the right to property is not infringed.
2.

Proportionality Analysis

After establishing that TECMED’s right to property in the
landfill was infringed through the government’s action the next
inquiry is whether the government’s action is a justified limitation on
TECMED’s right to property. That inquiry is particularly fact
specific. Since the arbitral tribunal did not engage in a human rights
analysis the government did not provide the facts to the standard
needed for a proportionality analysis according to the record. The
analysis is limited to the facts set out in the award.
(i) Is there a Legitimate Aim in Regard to the Measure in Question?
As set out under II.A. the right to health is a right protected
by ICESCR which the state has to progressively realize. The
Tribunal itself observed that:
the Arbitral Tribunal has to resolve any dispute
submitted to it by applying international law
What constitutes a “fair”, “just”, or “reasonable” compensation is of
course a matter of contention. It is beyond the scope of this article. For further
reading in regard to the ECtHR: Helene Ruiz Fabri, Approach taken by the European
Court of Human Rights to the Assessment of Compensation for Regulatory Expropriations of the
Property of Foreign Investors, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J,., 148, 165 et seq. (2002).
142
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provisions (Title VI.1 of the Appendix to the
Agreement), for which purpose the Arbitral Tribunal
understands that disputes are to be resolved by
resorting to the sources described in Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice
considered, also in the case of customary international
law, not as frozen in time, but in their evolution. 143
Interestingly, the Tribunal only applied international law and
customary international law in regard to its understanding of the right
to property and the question whether indirect de facto expropriation
amounted to expropriation. It did not discuss international law or
customary international law applicable to the citizens of Mexico.
Instead the tribunal found that it was not concerned with whether
non-renewal of the permit was legal under domestic law. It held:144
The Arbitral Tribunal will not review the grounds or
motives of the Resolution in order to determine
whether it could be or was legally issued. However, it
must consider such matters to determine if the
Agreement was violated. That the actions of the
Respondent are legitimate or lawful or in compliance
with the law from the standpoint of the Respondent’s
domestic laws does not mean that they conform to
the Agreement or to international law.
Even if the Tribunal is correct by not reviewing the legality of
the non-renewal of the permit under domestic law the Tribunal in
accordance with its own reliance on Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice has to take into account the
international law and the international customary law applicable to
the citizens of the state.
The state is obligated under Article 12 ICESCR to safeguard
and to progressively realise the highest attainable standard of the
health of its citizens. To protect its citizens from the health effects of
TECMED v Mexico, supra note 137, at para. 116 n.133 (May 29,
2003) (citing Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case no. ARB (AF)/99/2,
para. 116 (Oct. 11, 2002)).
144 Id. at para. 120.
143

367

2017

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

5:2

hazardous waste is an obvious obligation. The denial to renew a
permit for a landfill where hazardous waste is deposited due to the
urbanisation of the area is a measure that is in accordance with the
state’s duty to safeguard its citizens’ health and an aim the state is
under an international obligation to realise.
(ii) Is the Measure Suitable to Achieve the Aim?
On the available facts the closure and relocation of the
landfill is a suitable measure to avoid a hazard for the citizens of the
close by urban centre. The municipality’s motivation was stated
as:145“[to] secure environmental safety in view of the rapid urban
growth of Hermosillo, provide a response to the concerns that had
been expressed and guarantee, in the long term, the environmental
infrastructure to handle and dispose of industrial waste”.
(iii) Is the Measure Necessary to Achieve the Aim?
The facts indicate that TECMED operated the landfill in
accordance with all safety regulations and that the operation and even
a proposed extension of the operation did not and would not
threaten the public health of the citizens of the nearby town or the
environment. 146 Therefore the non-renewal of the permit was not
necessary to achieve the aim of safeguarding the citizens of
Hermosillo from a public health threat and environmental disaster.
However, it can be argued that a landfill that contains hazardous
waste even if compliant with all safety regulations poses an inherent
threat to the health of a nearby urban centre. By closing landfills
containing hazardous waste close to urban centres is a preventative
measure progressively realizing the right to health under Article 12
ICESCR.

145
146

Id. at para. 110.
Id. at para. 131.
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(iv) Is the Measure the Least Rights Infringing Means to Achieve the
Aim?
If the non-renewal of the license is the only measure suitable
to prevent a health threat to the citizens of the nearby urban centre.
It has to be borne in mind, that the need to dispose of hazardous
waste is a necessary by-product of modern civilisation. Therefore, the
state would potentially breach its obligations under Article 12
ICESCR by closing one landfill where hazardous waste can be
disposed of without allowing for the hazardous waste to be disposed
of somewhere else since it would risk the illegal dumping of
hazardous waste. With that in mind the question arises whether the
blanket non-renewal of the license is the least infringing measure or
whether the non-renewal of the license accompanied with either
compensation for the loss of the business and/or the offer of a
different site to resume TECMED’s business would have been a least
infringing measure. According to the facts, it is worthy to note that
negotiations in regard to relocating TECMED’s business to a
different site had taken place during and after the non-renewal of the
perm it but had ultimately ceased.147 The least infringing measure in
regard to TECMED’s property interest would have been to either
offer a new site for its operation or adequately compensate them for
its loss of business. As noted above, II.B.3. (especially footnote 92),
the right to property has the inherit limitation that generally
expropriation has to be accompanied with fair compensation to be
justified. Even though the facts are silent on the issue it seems that
for the state to fulfil its obligation under ICESCR and its obligation
towards TECMED the least infringing measure would have been to
offer an alternative site for TECMED’s operation. However, it is
acknowledged that the state can make choices in how to realize its
obligations. Therefore, the state instead of relocating TECMED’s
business could have compensated TECMED for its loss of property
and organised the disposal of hazardous waste differently. By not
doing either the state did not use the least infringing measure to
achieve its aim. The non-renewal of the permit without either fair
compensation or re-location of TECMED’s business is therefore
disproportionate to the state’s aim to safeguard the health of its
citizens. It is an justified limit on TECMED’s right to property.
147

Id. at para. 112.

369

2017

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

5:2

(v) Considering the competing interests of the different rights bearers at
hand is the measure proportional?
Since the non-renewal of the licence is not the least infringing
measure available to the state TECMED’s right to property is
disproportionally limited in balance with the citizens’ right to health.
3.

Conclusion

Using a human rights methodology to analyze TECMED’s
claim against Mexico in regard to the expropriation of its business
demonstrates that a human rights analysis will take the rights of the
investor into account. A human rights analysis will provide for an
analytical framework that will allow a tribunal to balance the rights of
the investor with that of the state’s citizens. The use of a human
rights framework will lead to more fully developed arguments under
international law. It is significant that in TECMED the Tribunal
relied on Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice in regard to the investor but not in regard to the state’s
citizens. Using the human rights framework in aiding its decision
tribunals would combat what, commentators generally agree, that
international investment law and arbitration have an adverse impact
on the promotion and protection of human rights.148
Having established a breach of the investor’s right to
property the question becomes what the appropriate remedy for a
breach of the human rights violation is. The question of
compensation is without doubt of utmost importance for the victims

See Ryan Suda, The Effect of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Human Rights
Enforcement and Realization 2 (N.Y.U. Global Law, Working Paper No. 1, 2005).
148
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of human rights abuses.149 In regard to the violation of the right to
property the ECtHR has generally held that:150
the protection of the right to property … would be
largely illusory and ineffective in the absence of any
equivalent principle. Clearly, compensation terms are
material to the assessment whether the contested
legislation respects a fair balance between the various
interests at stake and, notably, whether it does not
impose a disproportionate burden on the applicant.
The aim of this paper was to demonstrate that using a human
rights framework to analyze an investor-state dispute will adequately
address the rights of the investor and the state’s citizens. Using a
human rights methodology will aid a tribunal’s analysis of the dispute
and will contribute to the legitimacy of its decision. The question of a
fair remedy is outside the scope of this paper.
IV. GENERAL CONCLUSION
There is no need for an arbitral tribunal in an investor-state
dispute to have any “Berührungsängste” in regard to human rights.
International human rights do provide a methodological framework
that allows for a balanced consideration of both the investor’s
position but also the respective state’s citizens’ rights which the state
has to safeguard and/or progressively implement. The investor’s right
to property which is at the center of the contention is not an isolated

See, e.g., DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW (2015); EWA BGINSKA, DAMAGES FOR VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS (Springer,
Heidelberg, 2015); JASON VARUHAS, DAMAGES AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Hart, 2016);
JAGMOHAN MISHRA, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION: CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS &
REMEDIES (Akansha Publishing, 2011); see also G.A. Res. 60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005).
150 James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 54 (1986);
see also Lithgow v. United Kingdom, 102 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 120 (1986);
Holy Monasteries v. Greece, 301-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), paras. 70-75 (1994);
Hentrich v France, 209-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 48 (1994); Pressos Compania
Naviera SA v. Belgium, A332 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 38 (1995); Guillemin v.
France, 1997-I Eur. Ct. H.R., paras. 52-57 (1997).
149
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right but a right which is instrumental, in the company with other
rights, in fostering socio-economic well-being151 Only the interplay
and inclusion of all members of a society, natural and legal persons,
nationals or foreigners, can society strive and attain the highest
possible standard of well-being. The international human rights
framework recognizes this and has tasked the state with the duty
through fair and reasonable government, i.e. through balancing the
rights of every member of society, to progressively achieve the
highest possible standard of well-being.
An international arbitral tribunal, as part of the international
community, is charged with overseeing whether the state has
balanced the rights at play justifiably. In essence, there can be no
doubt that the state has to be able to take any measure which
enhances the human rights of its citizens or safeguards them from
harm. If that measure infringes the rights of the investor the measure
will be justified if the investor is compensated. In other words, the
state can do anything as long as it compensates the investor. There
might be situations where the measure is of such importance that in
balance the property infringement of the investor does not warrant
compensation. 152
For an investment tribunal to include a human rights analysis
into its decision-making process will increase its legitimacy. Even
though desirable, there is no need for stronger human rights clauses
in investment treaties. The investment tribunals bear the
responsibility to implement the law, regardless whether states and
investors felt before responsible for including a human rights clause
in their investment treaties. Since human rights provide the
overarching framework any investment treaty, bi-lateral or multilateral, has to be interpreted in light of human rights and is limited by
them. Accordingly, also lawyers should be aware that they enjoy the
opportunity to introduce human rights considerations into the
arbitral conversation153, as already mentioned no matter for which
151 Luis Valencia Rodríquez, The right of everyone to own property alone as well
as in association with others, para. 116, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/19 (Nov. 25, 1993).
152 As noted earlier, it is outside the scope of this paper to discuss what
constitutes fair compensation.
153 Luke Eric Peterson & Kevin R. Gray, International Human Rights in
Bilateral Investment Treaties and in Investment Treaty Arbitration 20 (International
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side they argue. Then red riding hood and the wolf may have a break
from playing tag and come more often together for a cup of tea on
eye level.

Institute for Sustainable Development Research Paper, Apr.
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2003/investment_int_human_rights_bits.pdf
accessed Feb. 15, 2017).
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